The EU’s Chronic Surplus: Handsome Figures Concealing a Deep Structural Decline

In an article entitled The European Union’s External Imbalances: Past, Future, and Policy (Bruegel, Working Paper 07/2026) a group of authors led by Jeromin Zettelmeyer, director of Bruegel, an influential Brussels think tank, and Zsolt Darvas, point to a disturbing situation: for more than a decade, the European Union has had a persistent current account surplus of around 3 percent of GDP. That might seem a sign of macroeconomic stability and strength, but actually conceals a serious structural crisis that undermines the whole continent’s future and long-term competitiveness.

After the global financial crisis, southern and eastern Europe had to cut investment drastically to eliminate huge deficits. The EU’s surplus was boosted by a profound decline in investment activity, not by an economic boom. Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden continue accumulating excessive savings while many countries of the Union suffer from chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, innovation, green transition and human capital. As a result, Europe is gradually turning into an affluent rentier entity that prefers to export capital instead of investing in its own development.

The authors expressly admit that such a surplus is unlikely to trigger a global crisis but highlights the EU’s fundamental internal issue of structurally weak domestic investment. Despite endless talk about the ‘green deal’, ‘digital transformation’, ‘strategic autonomy’, and ‘competitiveness’, real investment in the economy remains sluggish. Savings are high in the EU, while investment is not. This is a classical symptom of a stagnant and ageing economy that loses momentum.

It is particularly worrisome that this surplus has every chance to persist for many years. Population ageing, a weak investment climate, bureaucracy, high firing costs, a shortage of skilled personnel and inefficient capital markets continue to stifle growth. Even the reforms suggested by the authors (deepening capital markets, improving the business environment, and reforming the fiscal rules) may fail to produce the desired effect or may even lead to a further growth of savings.

The document shows a clear-cut division within the EU: the north (Germany, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries) keeps piling up surplus while the south and east have not yet recovered from previous crises. Instead of cohesion and mutual support, Europe has seen a new internal imbalance that only aggravates Euroscepticism in CEE countries.

While Brussels and the European élites boast of ‘external stability’ and the surplus, reality looks far worse: Europe is gradually losing its competitiveness vis-à-vis the USA and China. Investment in information technology, innovation, and modern infrastructure remains low. Instead of becoming a vibrant pole in a multipolar world, the EU risks turning into a well-to-do but slowly withering continent that lives off its former grandeur.

Summing up, the EU’s persistent surplus is not a sign of economic power but an alarming system of deep systemic illness. Pretty macroeconomic figures disguise actual inadequacy of investment, innovation, and growth. While European politicians continue boasting of external stability, the continent slowly loses ground in global competition. One more clear confirmation of the European project’s structural weakness and lack of a strategic vision is that the EU prefers to hide behind surplus statistics which actually points to stagnation and creeping loss of a future – instead of addressing its fundamental domestic problems.