On Externalization of Asylum, with Responsibility Offloaded to Third Countries

In the run-up to the Dutch general elections in the autumn of 2025, the question of the modernization of migration and asylum policies was raised as a topical issue. Some parties advocated a fundamental reform of the asylum system, whereby parts of the asylum procedure would take place outside the European Union and refugees would only be able to come to Europe through resettlement. What will this lead to? And what are the difficulties of this process?

The issue was examined by the ‘Clingendael’ Netherlands Institute of International Relations, a leading foreign relations academy and think tank.

In parallel, there is an ongoing debate about a completely new asylum system that should permit so-called ‘externalization of asylum’. This is the term for a practice of delegating control over migration flows and examination of asylum applications to third countries via supranational cooperation mechanisms.

Despite those arguments in favor of considering externalization, it is essential that such measures are not taken in isolation, for just in that case they evoke an association with ‘shifting responsibility’. In Europe, little account is often taken of the fact that countries outside Europe, which take in the largest numbers of refugees, also face major problems.

Important parts of the EU asylum legislation are territorially limited and only concern applications lodged in EU territory. The EU not only protects refugees but also ‘subsidiary protection beneficiaries’ and also offers temporary protection to Ukrainian displaced persons on the basis of the Temporary Protection Directive. Previously, a substantial link between the applicant and the third country (e.g. family ties or prior residence) was required. This is no longer mandatory.

Applicants whose claims are likely to be well-founded are transferred to a (jointly determined) destination country, where they undergo the full asylum procedure. Those found to be entitled to asylum receive protection in the destination country; those whose claims are rejected enter that state’s return procedure.

Clingendael analysts have examined the risks posed by this model. Politically, its success depends on the willingness of transit countries to cooperate in the screening and, for asylum applications that are likely to be unfounded, to conduct the entire asylum process – including return of the rejected applicant to their country of origin. This requires strong, mutually beneficial partnerships, which take time to build.

In addition, it may be difficult to find political support in Europe for such arrangements, as the system could lead to broader access to protection in Europe. Individuals found in need of protection could be transferred to the EU, which may act as a significant ‘pull factor’. This effect could be moderated by resettlement quotas, based on three factors: the capacity of the location, public support for refugee reception, and agreements with the non-EU country (mutual quota allocation). And, finally, the establishment and management of screening facilities in third countries by one or more States poses major operational challenges that require a robust monitoring of reception and return conditions by such organizations as the UNHCR and IOM and, where appropriate, by the EUAA or Frontex.

The authors of the report note that the practicability of the migration reforms will largely depend on non-EU countries’ willingness to cooperate. Put simply, such countries may – and are entitled to – be reluctant to host the flow of refugees whom Europe refuses to take in. There is clearly an attempt to offload responsibility to other countries – a long-standing sin of European democracies. But will it all work – or remain just pretty words and flashy concepts?